Fact #4|Ex-Parte Seizure Home and Contents| State Criminal

FACT #4

EX-PARTE SEIZURE OF HOME AND ALL CONTENTS

Ex-Parte Petition/Order to Show Cause order on a non-party, no advanced notice of a motion for real (condominium) and personal property lien on (condominium) my property resulting in two court orders within 24 hours of each other, on September 1 and 2, 1999 (TAKEN UNDER ADVISEMENT 11-8-99/NO RULING):

Chief Judge Maceroni, Macomb County Circuit Court, Court Orders:

9/1/99: Seizure, sealing, inventory, setting aside quitclaim deed to the third party (stepmother), and immediate possession of my home (condominium);
9/2/99: Lien on the title of my condominium (cloud on the title for three years);
9/23/99: Ex-parte motion requesting a court order to sell my home.

Litigants and their family members are terrorized by real crimes and silenced by “Blackmail/Extortion Orders” to illegally deprive them of exposing and reporting these crimes under color of law and are forced into litigation for courts to steal their assets, homes, and possessions:

September 1, 1999, Macomb County Circuit Court, Chief Maceroni, Partial Court Transcript:

Perakis: One is: Do you have any knowledge of any assets owned by Christine Morrison at this time of any kind?
Betty Morrison (stepmother): No
MACERONI: I think we did cover that, but you told me one thing that I wasn’t aware of in our discussion in chambers. You said land contract vendee interest.

September 22, 1999, Mr. McKinney (my attorney) filed a Motion for Abatement of Child Support Order (disabled 12/98), Rehearing of Orders dated September 1 and 2 in 1999:

The Defendant has learned that on or about September 1, 1999, that this Court entered a Judgment against Defendant without notice or an opportunity to defend in violation of her Constitutional Rights to due process of law. By a hearing on September 1, 1999, the Court further ordered the seizure of assets exceeding $100,000.00 by Plaintiff, again without notice to Defendant or opportunity to defend in violation of her Constitutional Rights to due process of law, which had the effect of excluding her from her home. Further, the Order of Lien Dated September 2, 1999, incorrectly states that Notice of Hearing has been served on both parties, when in fact (Christine) received no notice, and no proof of service is contained in this Court’s file. That the Orders entered allowing a lien, seizure, and inventory are beyond the Court’s authority and was excessive in the scope and amount of property seized and placed (Christine’s) assets at risk without an appropriate bond or other protections.
That on September 22, 1999, (Christine) has paid, with borrowed funds, to the Macomb County Friend of the Court, under protest and with full preservation of her appellate rights $25,846, which represented the full amount owed under the Judgment dated September 1, 1999 and included all arrearage plus two weeks of child support and all administrative Friend of the Court fees. That, as a result of these actions, (Christine) has paid the Friend of the Court account through October 11, 1999.
This Court’s blatant violation of the Court Rules and Ms. Morrison’s constitutional rights with its Court Orders of September 1, 1999, and execution thereon by its Order of September 2, 1999, and the Court’s impending hearing of a Motion for sale of her home, scheduled for September 23, 1999, but not served (to Christine) as of this date, September 22, 1999, establishes that this Court is biased against Christine Morrison and cannot act impartially toward her, according to MCR 2.003(A) and (8)(1).
WHEREFORE, Defendant prays that this Court will grant her an immediate abatement against the Court’s Ordered Child support; and FURTHER WHEREFORE, Defendant prays that this Court will grant her an immediate stay of its Order of July 14, 1999 (no bond bench warrant), for Defendant cannot be found in contempt of the Court’s Child Support Order when she has been unable to work since December 10, 1998, and this Court’s further preventing her access to her property by this Court’s Order dated September 1, 1999, and any use of her equity in that property, and by virtue of a payment in full of all currently stated arrearages and Court-ordered costs.
FURTHER WHEREFORE, this Court abate the Child Support Order retroactive to December 10th, 1998, the date the injury was sustained, and not allow interest on any arrearage.
FURTHER WHEREFORE, this Court allow the Defendant access to the real property located in the city of Fraser, Michigan, and her personal property.
FURTHER WHEREFORE, this Court allow a rehearing as to the Judgment Dated September 1, 1999, the Lien Order dated September 2, 1999, and the Order allowing inventory of personal property, sealing of real property, and notice dated September 1, 1999, and in fact set aside said orders for lack of notice to Defendant and mootness since all monies contained in the Judgment and Lien have been paid to the Macomb County Friend of the Court, plus expenses (Perakis attorney award fees ) incurred by Ms. Morrison approaching $2,500.
FURTHER WHEREFORE, this Court Judge will disqualify himself from all further actions in this case, forthwith, and the case shall be reassigned by blind draw reassignment by the Clerk’s office.

October 11, 1999, Attorney Perakis sent a letter to my attorney, Mr. McKinney which stated:

My client cannot consent to an Order Returning the Condominium keys to Ms. Morrison (no money owing).

November 8, 1999, my Attorney McKinney filed a Motion for rehearing on Orders dated September 1 and 2, 1999. The Court record shows admitted judicial bias and full monetary satisfaction of September 1 and 2, 1999 court orders, but Chief Judge Maceroni rules “motion taken under advisement”:

McKINNEY: I have several motions up today, your Honor. I believe the first one we should address is the motion to disqualify this Court from continuing to have jurisdiction over this case. I have submitted a memorandum of the actions taken by this Court that I believe demonstrate the bias and prejudice of this Court.
I think the first issue is on July 14th, 1999, when this Court issued a civil bench warrant (no bond) for contempt, alleging (Christine) had failed to appear on an order to show cause because hearing scheduled for that date. The problem with that is, your Honor, that a review of the transcripts indicates at that time the attorney representing Ms. Morrison was requesting an evidentiary hearing on her ability to pay. As such, the Court should have granted an evidentiary hearing on that matter and set the matter for hearing.
However, the Court indicated that it was going to rule on that, that issue and at that time coming back in the afternoon; the defendant refused to return. It is my contention that the failure to give an evidentiary hearing was evidence of the bias, the fact that you were already going to rule on the motion before allowing an evidentiary hearing on her ability to work showed bias and prejudice by the Court.
Additionally, the warrant was issued was for civil contempt and was made without a bond, and therefore was in violation of the laws that require on the civil contempt that the keys to the jail be in the hands of the contempt or. In this case, a bond should have been set that would have allowed her to not be placed in jail pending an ultimate hearing in this court.
Additionally, on September 1, this Court again allowed to be heard and entered orders against the Defendant without notice or opportunity for her to defend, which violated her constitutional rights to due process.
COURT: Where do you suggest that we would have sent her notice?
McKINNEY: I would have suggested you send it to her last known address, or at least some effort be made to serve those. It seems to me what happened, in that case, was the Court allowed a judgment to be entered without notice, it then imposed a lien on property without notice, which then placed my client’s residence, real property, in the possession of the Plaintiff—again without notice.
It caused her to be removed from her home, and she has now been out of her home since September 1, by the locks being changed by the Plaintiff under your court order. This was all done without any notice to, to the defendant. I have an affidavit from Ms. Frederick (Christine’s prior attorney) indicating she did not receive notice of any hearing. Also, Ms. Morrison is here.
She received no notice of the hearing, and this Court proceeded to enter various orders, and what’s even more, I think, egregious in this case is that this was not even a motion that was originally or initially directed at the Defendant; it was directed at a non-party to the case, a Betty Morrison, who happens to be Ms. Morrison’s stepmother. The order that set it for hearing was an Order to Show Cause that only directed Ms. Betty Morrison be here. So, even the stepmother could not have advised her of what was going on at this hearing. Proceeding beyond that, actually allowing it, even had she been here, violated numerous and various statutes. I’ve mentioned them in my presentation of all the bias of the Court.
First of all, under MCLA 566.11, the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act—that’s the statute under which the motion was brought—requires to obtain jurisdiction of all necessary parties including whoever the person who allegedly received the transfer along with the transferee, and that she’s also entitled to a jury trial on the issue of the fraudulent transfer. That is because when you are trying a title for fraudulent conveyance under MCLA 600.6131, the issue of fraudulent intent is a question of fact, and that question of fact is for the jury. It is not a question of law; therefore, in an action to try title, an action to declare an act of fraudulent conveyance, we have a right to a jury trial, number one, and number two, it is not to be handled in a summary proceeding by the issuance of a Show Cause order on someone who is not even party to the litigation.
Next, I believe, the Plaintiff had cited MCLA 552.625 as support for issuing a lien on the support of the Defendant in this case, specifically her house. That statute specifically requires that it can only be entered after notice to the payer and an opportunity for a hearing. This Court, number one, didn’t require notice to the defendant, and number two, issued relief without the opportunity for a hearing, again, I believe, demonstrating bias and prejudice of the Court.
Additionally, the Court violated Michigan law by imposing a lien upon the property. Under MCLA 552.27, the lien can only be imposed as a part of the Judgment of Divorce. In this case, there was no Judgment of Divorce. Under Wells v. Wells, 144 Michigan Appeal 722, the Court has no authority at that point under 552.27 to issue a lien on the property unless that right is reserved in the initial Judgment of Divorce, and it is not. More specifically, the Defendant’s property, including many items of personal nature, are exempt from execution under MCLA 600.6023. The Court allowed, in effect, the Plaintiff, prior to the finalization of the Judgment, have possession of all the items of property that are exempt from execution contained in her home, including pictures and so forth. I’ve cited the statute and provided all the things that are exempt from execution. Another thing is this Court allowed him to have possession of it.
Now, let’s back up. The amount of the arrearage that was alleged at the time was in the neighborhood of $25,000. This condominium is worth approximately $70,000. There is an additional $20,000–$30,000 worth of personal property contained in that condominium.
This Court allowed the Plaintiff, without any opportunity for the Defendant to appear or have any notice of the hearing, to seize those assets, and he’s now maintained those assets without bond, without any protection for or anything that would rightfully belong to the Defendant, and allowed him to have those since September 1, and have done nothing to return the property to the Defendant.
By the way, we have requested it, and Mr. Perakis wrote me a letter that I received on Friday, indicating they will return the condominium that she’s been dispossessed of since September 1, by virtue of this Court’s order. Further, the statements made in open court by this Court also indicate that you have some prejudice against the defendant. Specifically, when I appeared here on September 23, this Court indicated, despite my filing of motions, that it would not hear any motions presented by me on her behalf until she appeared before you.
Additionally, your Honor, on the issue of the Show Cause hearing, I have now requested an evidentiary hearing, and this Court has granted. This Court, when we appeared on October 7, conducted a hearing and proceeded to find my client in contempt prior to any evidentiary hearing, and therefore, it appears that any hearing on the issue of contempt has already been decided by this Court and would show that you have predecided the case, prior to any evidence being submitted. I presume the evidentiary hearing is going to establish that my client has not had the opportunity to work since December 10, 1998; therefore, she has no income.
She also has medical restrictions that make her unable to continue her career, and therefore, to earn the type of income that she had prior. I believe we will also have evidence presented that she has, in fact, paid all child support arrearages; therefore, there is no reason for contempt proceedings to continue. On the issue of a motion to disqualify you.
COURT: I would assume you want me to answer that issue before I rule on any more motions, right?
McKINNEY: That’s correct.
COURT: Okay. Counsel?
PERAKIS: Your Honor, you know, with regard to your motion or his motion to disqualify you, this case has been up on appeal to the Court of Appeals in fact to disqualify you. When that issue was, was decided by Judge Nowicki, there was an appeal taken to the Court of Appeals in May of 1999. That appeal was dismissed. The application for leave to appeal was dismissed. That for leave to appeal by Ms. Morrison also included this issue of disability. That was once again dismissed by application, on the application for leave to appeal. Many of these issues you’ve been, had been before you on at least three or four occasions, you have made decisions in the past, and your Honor, what’s very ironic about this case and what Ms. Morrison has continued to do is abuse this court system, as I believe this Court is well aware.
MACERONI: What’s disturbing to me is that if any bias was shown it was toward Ms. Morrison, especially when she was unrepresented by counsel. Motion to disqualify me is denied.
McKINNEY: I have an order, your Honor.
COURT: Counsel, as you well know, in my capacity as Chief Judge, you have every right to appeal this, but the Supreme Court Administrator’s office must assign someone other than one of my colleagues. Now, if you want to exercise your right, you go right ahead. If not, if you want me to rule on the other motions, I will.
McKINNEY: No, your Honor. I do have additional motions, your Honor. Specifically, I have a motion for relief from the judgments that were entered on or about September 1, 1999, in this case. As I stated earlier, I believe that all of those orders were done without notice or opportunity to defend by Ms. Morrison, and in fact, since that time, although the Plaintiff still has possession of the property, the Judgment that underlines the presumed reason for giving him possession has been satisfied and there is no legal or factual basis upon which he should, number one, continue to maintain possession, and number two, continue to maintain a lien issued pursuant to a Judgment that has been satisfied in full.
Additionally, as I indicated earlier, I believe that the orders were improperly obtained without notice or opportunity and in fact, violated numerous statutes and my client’s constitutional rights. Therefore, I’d ask that the judgments entered on September 1, which include the Judgment for back child support be set aside and vacated, the lien order also vacated, and the Plaintiff be ordered to return possession of the property to the defendant. It is my understanding that there’s also a videotape recording, at least from Mr. Perakis, of the items of personal property that were contained in the premises at the time (Mr. Hannaford) took over. I would like a copy of that videotape, so we can confirm what was there at the time he took over and what might be there when we retake possession. I would also like to have keys since he’s apparently changed the locks.
COURT: Mr. Perakis, what are you suggesting to the Court?
PERAKIS: What I’m asking, your Honor, is this: Is that if we were to take a look at what the future child support is, place a lien on the condominium to the full extent of its value, and allow that issue to be dealt with at a later date, so long as child support is current. If child support is current, the lien will be reduced as to each payment the child support occurs, and at the point that child support is paid-in-full, the lien will be released.
COURT: Response to that?
McKINNEY: Well, your Honor, there is no statutory requirement or authority to determine what “future child support” might be and impose a lien based upon what future child support might be. As of today, there is a zero balance on the Friend of the Court obligation here.
What he’s asking you to do is to determine what this child support is going to be for the next eight years, impose a lien on the property to that extent. There is no basis for that in law. Bottom line here is this property, and beyond that (Christine) still, is being denied her property. It is one thing to impose a lien; it is another to lock the doors and keep her out, so she’s required to live on the streets. This is what the Court did by its order of September 1.
COURT: On a piece of property that she didn’t even own, she deeded it to somebody else. I’m going to take the motion under advisement in connection with the lien, stand by your letter, return the premises to Ms. Morrison. What is your next motion?
McKINNEY: My next motion is to abate de novo child support order and other relief. Your Honor, we had this hearing in front of the Friend of the Court, and my client and I have a doctor’s letter, a doctor’s affidavit, and deposition testimony indicating that she’s been disabled.
COURT: I’ll give you an evidentiary hearing (Order granted 12/28/99 heard November 7, 2001).
McKINNEY: Thank you, your Honor. And my final motion is a motion to quash the evidentiary hearing on the bench warrant. I have submitted a brief on the issue of the contempt hearing indicating that since this is civil contempt and since if the Court is attempting to punish the Defendant for past action, the past action of “not returning for an afternoon hearing,” which appears to be what the Court is considering, that is not civil contempt, but rather criminal contempt. She’s not been charged with criminal contempt, and there is no basis for this Court to continue with a civil contempt hearing when in fact, the underlying offense of the payment of child support has in fact been remedied by full payment.
Also, the issue was addressed by this Court when we appeared on October 7 was the issue of Mr. Perakis’s fees. The Court had not set aside the September 1 order when this Court awarded him $2,165 in attorney fees, which have been paid. Mr. Perakis represented on the record those were the fees he incurred to collect the child support; therefore, it does not appear that even sanctioning her in terms of awarding additional attorney fees is appropriate, and therefore, the whole bench warrant issue and the evidentiary hearing should be quashed and dismissed. The bench warrant should be withdrawn.

Nine weeks later, my home was returned, but thousands of dollars in personal property were missing. The condo association placed a lien on the title due to non-payment of the association fees for nine weeks that I later had to pay. However, on November 18, 1999, a demand letter was sent to Mr. Perakis for the videotape inventory along with the return of missing property. Mr. Perakis did not respond. It was not until July 3, 2003, Hannaford released the unlawful lien clouding the title.

PREDICTABLY, October 31, 2001, in a response letter by Michigan Attorney General, Jennifer Granholm to a grievance from my attorney about judicial misconduct, she wrote: “court decisions can only be reviewed or altered by appealing the decision to a higher court.” In fact, multiple claims of appeals were dismissed (April 9, 1999, January 18, 2000, April 24, 2000, September 14, 2000, December 7, 2000, February 20, 2001, September 4, 2001, February 10, 2009) for clear, obvious, egregious errors in the law (Remand order 6-30-00 on an ex-parte motion that caused parental alienation), and TWO MOTIONS REMAIN, “TAKEN UNDER ADVISEMENT”.